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Abstract
This paper investigates the extent to which expansion of international
production by US multinationals reduces labor demand at home and at
other foreign locations. The few existing empirical studies on this subject
maintain, along with …rm’s cost minimizing behavior, perfectly variable in-
puts. In our view, this constitutes a strong restriction, which may seriously
bias the short run cross-price elasticity estimates. We o¤ers simple exam-
ples in which this is actually the case. We suggest an alternative approach
to the problem, which explicitly considers for the presence of adjustment
costs. A dynamic model of the …rm is applied to estimate short-run and
long-run cross-price elasticities between home and foreign labor. We …nd
evidence of signi…cant adjustment costs for employment in Latin American
and Canadian a¢liates. We also …nd that, in some instances, due to the
presence of slow input adjustments, the complementarity/substitution rela-
tionship between employment in di¤erent international locations is reversed
from the short to the long-run.
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In the ongoing debate on the effects of globalization on wages and employment, one of the most
crucial issues is the role played by multinational companies. It is claimed that, as long as
multinationals establish and/or expand overseas production, they tend to substitute workers at home
with workers in foreign affiliates’ countries. Then one of the most studied aspect of home country
effects of globalization has been whether employment in foreign affiliates is a ’substitute’ or a
’complement’ to home country employment of the parent firms.
This paper tackles substitution-versus-complementarity issue by applying an empirical model
of multinational behavior that accommodates input adjustment costs. In fact, the presence of costs
in adjusting quasi-fixed inputs influences factor demand decisions and the related price elasticities,
and consequently explanations of firm behavior using static model may be misleading. Our results
confirm that this is actually the case. In some instances, due to the presence of slow input
adjustments, the complementarity/substitution relationship between employment in different
international locations is reversed from the short to the long-run.
In the recent literature, a number of authors have investigated the interplay of multinationals’
activities and labor markets by using static approach. Slaughter (1995), using industry-distributed
data, finds weak evidence of US multinationals’ substituting home with foreign labor. Brainard and
Riker (1997a), (1997b) confirm Slaughter’s finding for a panel data of US foreign affiliates and
parents. Slaughter (1995), using Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) data on US manufacturing
multinationals in the 1980s, estimates multinationals’ cost-minimization functions which treat all
factors of production, both domestic and foreign, as jointly chosen. From these functions, price
elasticities of demand between US and foreign labor are estimated. He chooses a translog
specification of the cost function and finds that domestic industry employment and overseas affiliate
employment are complementary, but only weakly so. Brainard and Riker (1997a) use a firm-level
panel of US multinationals and their foreign affiliates between 1983 and 1992. They analyze labor
demand within firms across plant locations, by fitting a firm-level global cost function specified in
terms of relative wages (which are taken as exogenous). They aggregate labor across subsets of
countries and treat each subset as separate factors. Brainard and Riker estimate substitution among
locations conditional on the capital stock. The authors find that substitution between labor
employment by parents in the United States and affiliates abroad is low. In contrast, in a related
paper, they find that there is strong substitution between workers at affiliates in alternative low
wage locations, where the activities most sensitive to labor costs are performed (Brainard and
Riker, 1997b). In a recent paper on Swedish multinationals, Braconier and Ekholm (1999) find
similar results.
Another strand in the literature has investigated the role of multinationals’ activities by
focussing on whether production abroad tends to raise or lower the labor intensity of home
production. In Blomstrom, Fors and Lipsey (1997), US multinationals seem to show lower labor
intensity of home production than Swedish parents in the presence of higher foreign production.
The authors’ argue that this result reflects the fact that US firms, much more than Swedish firms,
invest abroad to take advantage of factor price differences in a vertical division of activities among
countries. footnote  Similar conclusions are presented by Bassino (1998), studying the effects on
domestic labor market of increasing foreign direct investments towards low-wage Eastern Asian
countries by Japanese multinationals during the recession of the 1990s. footnote 
A relevant question is whether multinationals’ behavior is more accurately modeled using a
dynamic specification or adequately represented by static approaches. All the studies dealing with
the substitution-versus-complementarity issue maintain, along with firm’s cost minimizing
behavior, perfectly variable inputs and perfectly competitive labor markets. In our view, this static
framework is not adequate to set up an empirical model of multinationals’ behavior. We show by a
simple example that in a world in which employment adjustment costs and labor market
imperfections are important, a standard cost function approach can lead to misleading evidence
about the substitution-versus-complementarity issue.In this paper, we suggest and discuss an alternative line of attack to the problem, which
explicitly allows for the presence of adjustment costs. We measure short-run and long-run
cross-price elasticities within a more general set-up, in which the firm chooses variable inputs and
quasi-fixed inputs profiles in order to minimize its discounted flow of total cost over a given time
horizon. Also, we test for the presence of significant adjustment costs. This model was first
formalized by Treadway (1971) using a primal approach and then by Epstein (1981), using a dual
approach. The first empirical application of the dual approach is due to Epstein and Denny (1983).
In this study on US multinationals, we treat labor in different geographical locations as
quasi-fixed inputs and we test for the presence of adjustment costs. Although there is some
disagreement as to the structure and the size of the cost of adjusting factor demand, the literature
agrees that adjustment costs arising within a firm lead to optimal multi-period modifications of the
levels of quasi-fixed inputs in response to single-period price changes; and that a firm suffers
short-run costs of changing stocks of quasi-fixed factors. footnote  The sources of adjustment costs
associated with changing employment may be related to: searching activities (i.e. screening and
processing new employees); training (including disruptions to production as previously trained
workers’ time is devoted to on-the-job instruction of new workers); severance pay (mandated and
otherwise). When multiplant firms are considered, as is the case of multinational corporations, the
closing and opening of plants generates net adjustment costs.
The presence of costs in adjusting quasi-fixed inputs influences factor demand decisions and
the related price elasticities, and consequently explanations of firm behavior using static model may
be misleading. We estimate short-run and long-run cross-price elasticities of labor demand in
different locations, and we find that the relationship of complementarity or substitution between the
employment in different geographical areas may be reversed due to the presence of significant
adjustment costs.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section it is shown that problems of
incorrect inference can arise within the standard static cost function approach to multinationals’
international production. Section 4, after discussing some stylized facts on US multinationals
(Section 3), illustrates an alternative method of empirical analysis - the dynamic duality approach -
which may overcome some of the problems associated with the standard approach. The estimation
and testing strategy is presented in Section 5. Finally, in Section 6, the results are discussed.
Cost Minimizing Behavior and Price Substitutability: A
Simple Example
In what follows our attention is centered upon the cost minimization approach. We see several
sources of misspecification arising in such a context. To begin with, capital and employment
adjustment costs are likely to be not negligible, both in parent and affiliate firms. Slaughter (1995)
and Brainard and Riker (1997a) actually allow for both parent and affiliate capital as quasi-fixed
inputs, by conditioning the variable cost function on the capital stock. We claim that this is not
enough if labor is quasi-fixed because of adjustment costs in terms of foregone output. In this case
the employment variation with respect to the past year, and not just the current employment, is
likely to have an impact on the variable costs. Neglecting this possibility may therefore seriously
bias the estimates. Finally, non-competitive labor markets may also play a role as an important
source of misspecification.
As a prelude to the formal analysis of cost minimizing behavior in the presence of costly
adjusted inputs, we present a simple example of how, in such instance, a static optimization
approach can lead to incorrect inference about the nature of the input substitutability. This example
constitutes a simplified version of the general model upon which our empirical application is based.
As such, it provides a convenient introduction to some of the most crucial aspects of the empirical
analysis.
Consider a multinational company that produces a single output y from costly adjusted
employment at region A and perfectly variable employment at region B. The multinational company
minimizes its discounted flow of costs over an infinite horizon. Assume for simplicity that y = 1always. Also, assume that the intertemporal cost minimization problem yields the following
employment demand function in region A
l = L + Kw + Jl?1   #   
where w denotes the wage paid to workers at A normalized by the wage paid to workers at B, and
l?1 denotes the employment at A lagged one time. Optimizing behavior implies K < 0. In addition,
0 < J < 1 and L + Kw ‡ 0, which together imply that the employment path described by
( ref: affpath ) converges to a unique stable steady state
l = ￿L + Kw￿/￿1 ? J￿.   #   
Now, it is clear from ( ref: steady ) that unless l is always at its steady state level, there is no
hope to infer the long-run wage impact K/￿1 ? J￿ by regressing l on w alone. Nor, is it generally
possible to infer the short-run behavior K from the static regression. Let us see why this is so. If the
current wage and the past employment are correlated, as is likely in practice, the coefficient K
would not be identified in a regression that does not include l?1 on the right. Contract bargaining
with a monopoly union is one simple instance in which w depends on l?1. Assume that while the
multinational company takes w as given and determines l according to ( ref: affpath ), w is chosen
by a union with the following objective function
u￿w,l￿   #   
The function u is increasing in both arguments, strictly concave in l and such that
/2u￿w,l￿
/w/l ‡ 0. The
union chooses w to maximize ( ref: union ) subject to ( ref: affpath ). We assume the existence of
an internal solution w￿l?1￿, which satisfies the first order condition
u1 ? K
w
u2 = 0   #   
By applying the Implicit Function Theorem to the first order condition of such optimization




Therefore, a rise in the past employment causes both a rise in the current compensation, through
the union bargaining mechanism and a rise in the current employment, through the adjustment costs
effect. This is the crucial point of our example. If the role of the lagged employment in the
employment demand function is neglected, comovements of w and l, induced by lagged
employment variation across multinational firms, are mistaken as labor at A and labor at B being
price complements footnote .
Of course, this is not the only case in which we might find an association between current wage
and past employment. In fact, in the presence of both nominal and real rigidities, wages respond to
unexpected shocks slower than employment.
Finally, it is worth noting that the above considerations, besides emphasizing the necessity of
including input adjustment costs into the model specification, also suggest to treat the wage as an
endogenous variable. In fact, whatever type of labor market imperfection occurs in practice, it is
however very likely that w depends on any random shock affecting the employment demand,
casting some doubt on the regression analyses that treat w as exogenous.
With this in mind, we believe that more appropriate analytical tools than static cost
minimization should be employed. In particular, techniques allowing for the presence of adjustment
costs seems particularly useful in the analysis of multinationals’ international production. Also,
employing instrumental variable based estimation methods should help in attenuating the bias
induced by labor market imperfections. These are exactly the directions along which we shall move
for the empirical application.
Data and Stylized Facts on US Multinationals
This study uses industry-level data on US multinational companies. The data are collected andadministered on a mandatory basis by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The BEA Annual
and Benchmark Surveys of US Direct Investment Abroad report foreign affiliates and US parents
financial and operating data on an annual basis. footnote 
The data set includes all parents and foreign affiliates classified in the manufacturing sector.
The activities of manufacturing multinationals are aggregated into 32 different industries. We use
data from 1982 to 1994 and construct a panel including parents and affiliates total employment,
employee compensation, sales and total assets. footnote  Moreover, foreign affiliates are grouped
into four geographical areas reflecting, in a very broad sense, proximity and development
differences: Canada, Europe, Latin America and Rest of the World.
Before presenting the econometric estimates, we illustrate some stylized facts on US
multinationals. First we check whether there is some evidence on substitution between labor at
home and labor in foreign affiliates, particularly in low wage countries.
We find that, over the period 1982-1994, employment is declining both in parents and in
foreign affiliates, but in percentage terms this decline was larger for parents (-13.5%) than for
affiliates (-7.1%). As a result, relative employment in multinationals shifted slightly towards
affiliates (Figure 1).
Looking at how the allocation of affiliates’ employment has evolved across locations over time,
Figure 2 shows that the share of employment at affiliates in industrialized countries has marginally
declined, while the share at affiliates in Latin America has slightly expanded until 1993, with a
decline in 1994. On the contrary, the share of the Rest of the World shows a slow growth until
1993, and then an increase, offsetting the decline in Latin America.
Figure 3 shows corresponding changes in relative wages, defined as employee compensation of
affiliates in different locations over employee compensation of the parent. Figures 2 and 3 seem to
suggest that there is no simple correlation between changes in employment share and changes in
relative wages. In fact, increasing relative wages, as in the case of locations in Europe or in the Rest
of the World, are not associated to declining employment share and, at the same time, low relative
wages as in Latin America seem not to cause employment expansion.
Finally, we look at the persistence of employment levels over time, to find some evidence for
the presence of adjustment costs. We calculate the autocorrelation coefficients of employment’s
annual changes of the parents and of foreign affiliates in different geographical areas. We find that
foreign affiliates in Latin America and in Canada have positive degrees of persistence in
employment levels (respectively 0.17 and 0.11). Differently, autocorrelation coefficients for
Europe, the Rest of the World and the parents are negligible, suggesting absence of adjustment
costs (Table 1).
The structural econometric model is going to shed light on the significance of the foregoing
stylized facts.
The Dynamic Duality Approach to Adjustment Costs
The Theory
The theory of adjustment cost in production postulates that firms may suffer a short run loss in
terms of foregone output when they change their stocks of quasi-fixed inputs. To bring adjustment
costs into the analysis of multinational behavior, we follow the dynamic duality approach as
developed and implemented by Epstein and Denny (1983). The dual approach has the distinctive
advantage of simplifying the derivation of both the closed form solutions for the optimal input
demands and the complete list of model empirical implications.
The theory assumes that at time t the firm combines variable inputs v￿t￿ and quasi-fixed inputs
l￿t￿ to produce output y￿t￿ according to the production function footnote 
y = F￿
.
l,l,v￿   #   
Adjustments costs in terms of foregone output are modelled by assuming that F.




l < 0 if
.
l> 0 footnote . From F, we define the variable cost function CC￿
.
l,l,pv,y￿ = min
v pvv : y = F￿
.
l,l,v￿ ,
where pv is the vector of variable input prices. The firm is price taker with respect to pv and the
quasi fixed input prices pl, which are assumed always strictly positive. Let r > 0 denote the real
rate of discount, assumed constant over time. It is also assumed that the firm holds static
expectations on pl, pv and y. Given this, the firm chooses the rate of change path of the quasi fixed
inputs,
.
l, (dots denote derivatives with respect to time) and the variable input level v to minimize its
discounted flow of total costs (quasi-fixed cost added to variable cost) in continuous time and over
an infinite horizon. This defines the following intertemporal optimization problem with the





e?rt￿pll + pvv￿dt   #   




and l￿0￿ = l0 > 0.
Using the variable cost function, the problem ( ref: minval ) can be reformulated in a more
compact form




e?rt pll + C￿
.
l,l,pv,y￿ dt   #   
subject to l￿0￿ = l0 > 0, [see Epstein and Denny (1983)].
The variable cost function C offers a representation of the technology that is equivalent to F.
Thus, we assume that F is such that C satisfies the following properties a) C ‡ 0; b) Cl < 0; c)
C.
l > 0 if
.
l> 0 and C.
l < 0 if
.
l< 0; d) C is convex in
.
l; e) the problem ( ref: MinVal1 ) (or
( ref: minval )) has a unique globally stable steady state. Notice that property c) is dual to the
adjustment cost property of F.
The function J has a useful property, namely it satisfies the Hamilton-Jacobi equation [see
Arrow and Kurz (1970)]:







where Jl is the vector of shadow prices associated with quasi-fixed stocks. The Envelope theorem
and Shephard Lemma can then be applied to the foregoing equation to derive the policy functions




, and the variable input demands, vD, solutions to










  #   
Furthermore, the duality between C and J uncovers the J must satisfy the following list of





















is concave in pl; f) the stock profile lD associated with .
l
D
￿l,pl,pv,y￿ and l0 has a unique globally stable steady state l. Such conditions also offer an
exhaustive characterization of J [see Epstein and Denny (1983)].
The equations in ( ref: ddsystem ) constitute the system upon which we base our empirical
analysis.
The Empirical Model
We assume that a US multinational can allocate labor among the home parent and its affiliates
throughout the world. We focus on four different areas: Canada, Europe, Latin America and the
Rest of the world. Therefore, five production inputs are considered: parent employment, lp, affiliateemployment in Europe, le, affiliate employment in Canada, lc, affiliate employment in Latin
America, ll and affiliate employment in the rest of the world, lrw. For each input we have the
correspondent input price: plp, ple, plc, pll and plrw.
We maintain throughout that lrw is the only variable input, while lp, le, lc and ll are quasi fixed.
Thus v ﬂ lrw, pv ﬂ plrw, l ﬂ ￿lp,le,lc,ll￿ and pl ﬂ ￿plp,ple,plc,pll￿.
As in many dynamic duality applications, we choose a quadratic specification for J (see Epstein
and Denny (1983) among others).
J = Ao
i + Apl
i pl + Aplyply + Apvpv + All +
+ 1/2 ypl
TAplplpl + pv






  #   
Ao
i , Apl
i , Aply, Apv, Al are ￿4 ￿ 1￿ column vectors and Aplpl, Apvpv, Apll
?1, Apvl
?1, Aplpv, All are
￿4 ￿ 4￿ matrixes of constant parameters. We accommodate individual heterogeneity by allowing Ao
i
and Apl
i to vary across sectors.
Estimating the whole system ( ref: ddsystem ) would require the estimation of an extremely
large number of parameters, compared to the size of BEA data set. We, therefore, restrict





i + ry￿Aply + Aplplpl￿￿ + ￿rI ? Apll￿l.   #   
To make ( ref: qfsyst ) empirically implementable, we follow a standard practice in the
continuous time investment literature, which considers the discrete time approximation of
( ref: qfsyst ):
l = ApllApl
i + ryApll￿Aply + Aplplpl￿ + ￿rI + I ? Apll￿l?1,   #   
where I is the ￿4 ￿ 4￿ identity matrix. The reader can also notice that the model yields
sector-specific coefficients ApllApl
i .








Kpp Kpe Kpc Kpl
Kpe Kee Kec Kel
Kpc Kec Kcc Kcl
Kpl Kel Kcl Kll
and
Apll =
Jpp Jpe Jpc Jpl
Jep Jee Jec Jel
Jcp Jce Jcc Jcl
Jlp Jle Jlc Jll
.
According to the regularity conditions spelled out for J, Apll does not need to be a symmetric
matrix.
Estimation and testing strategy
Estimation
We now turn to the econometric methodology, starting with the estimation issues. To capture











v, we also maintain E￿OitOit
v ￿ = Fit, for all i = 1,...,N and t ﬁ s = 1,...,Ti.
That is, while we impose lack of serial correlation, we allow for simultaneous cross-equation
correlation. Quasi fixed input prices are normalized by the price of the variable input pv.
It is well known from the dynamic panel data literature that the standard within estimator
applied to a first order autoregressive model yields inconsistent estimates when only the number of
time periods Ti is large [see Nickell (1981), among others], which is not the case for most panels.
In our application the number of sector N is fixed footnote , but it is nonetheless large with respect
to Ti and, so, the inconsistency problem could well arise. To solve such a problem,
econometricians have suggested various instrumental variables approaches [Anderson and Hsiao
(1982), Arellano and Bond (1991), Ahn and Schmidt (1995) among others]. Here we follow the
Generalized Method of Moment estimator approach suggested by Arellano and Bond, widely used
in most recent dynamic panel data applications [Blundell, Bond, Devereux and Schiantarelli
(1992); Nickell, Wadhwani and Wall (1992); Bond and Meghir (1994); Galeotti, Guiso, Sack and
Schiantarelli (1996) among others], which exploits all available linear orthogonality conditions. The
procedure goes as follows.
The individual effects are eliminated by taking the model in first differences:
Al = r￿ApllAplyAy + ApllAplplA￿ypl￿￿ + ￿rI + I ? Apll￿Al?1 + AO   #   
Maintaining lack of serial correlation among the errors in levels does not rule out, however, the
possibility that the errors in first-differences exhibit MA(1) autocorrelation. We, therefore, follow
an instrumental variables approach to estimate ( ref: fdiff ), with the instruments optimally
weighted by the expected variance-covariance matrix of the orthogonality conditions, as required
by an optimal Generalized Method of Moment estimator [see Hansen (1982); Gallant (1987), p.
442].
The model generates valid instrumental variables under the form of opportunely trimmed
lagged endogenous variables. In fact, as O is a vector of serially uncorrelated random variables, the
following orthogonality conditions hold: E￿AOit
j lit?s
j ￿ = 0, s = 2,...,t ? 1, t = 3,...,Ti, i = 1,...,N
and j = p, e, c and l. Only these orthogonality conditions are exploited for estimation.
As a result, li,?2, li,?3, and further lags yield valid instruments. This is obviously true for all of
the endogenous variables considered. So, on principle, ￿TM ? 1￿￿TM ? 2￿/2 instruments can be
obtained from each endogenous variable, where TM = max￿T1,...,TN￿. For example, if
N = 2, T1 = 5 and T2 = 6, we have the following matrix of instruments Z generated by l1,?2, l1,?3,
l1,?4, l2,?2, l2,?3, l2,?4, and l2,?5
Z = .
l11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 l11 l12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 l11 l12 l13 0 0 0 0
l21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 l21 l22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 l21 l22 l23 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 l21 l22 l23 l24
As already mentioned in Section2, another source of departure of this analysis from the
received literature on multinationals is that we treat output y and relative wages pl/pv as potentially
endogenous. In fact, output is a strategic variable for a multinational firm, as such it could as well
be chosen along with the employment variations. It is also very likely that wage, employment and
output are affected by correled random shocks. In the view of these considerations, we instrument
both y and pl/pv by using the appropriate lags.
Capital stock, measured as total assets of the firm, is added to each equation in level and alsoincluded into the instrument set with the appropriate lags. To capture world economy effects, we
add time period dummies to each equation and also employ them as instruments. Then, abiding by
a standard practice in the dynamic duality applications, we take the real discount rate to be equal to
a given plausible value. The results reported are for r = 0.07. Other values have been tried,
confirming all of the results obtained for r = 0.07.
Our model is a dynamic four-equation system, using a potentially high number of instruments.
As such, it is computationally troublesome. In order to keep the computational difficulties to a
minimum, we have restricted our instrument set to the third and fourth lags for each endogenous
variable. Besides the other advantages, such choice of the instruments also permits to wipe out
measurement errors in the differenced system that present a degree of serial correlation up to the
second order.
Finally, the model is estimated by applying a Generalized Method of Moment estimator, as
coded by the TSP 4.4 procedure GMM, Following Bruno (1999), we adapt the single equation
two-step procedure by Arellano and Bond (1991) to a system of equations with cross-equation
parameter restrictions. This procedure is briefly summarized in Appendix A.
Hypothesis testing
Turning to the testing aspects, a convenient feature of our model is that it nests the case of
perfectly variable inputs. This hypothesis, therefore, can be tested by computing the joint
significance of the set of implied parameter restrictions. The reader can easily verify that the system
in ( ref: qfdiscr ) can be re-arranged according to the following more convenient form
Al = M l?1 ? l￿pl,y￿   #   
where M = rI ? Apll is the adjustment matrix
M =
r ? Jpp ?Jpe ?Jpc ?Jpl
?Jep r ? Jee ?Jec ?Jel
?Jcp ?Jce r ? Jcc ?Jcl
?Jlp ?Jle ?Jlc r ? Jll
,   #   
and l￿pl,y￿ = ?￿rI ? Apll￿?1￿ApllApl
i + ryApll￿Aply + Aplplpl￿￿ is the vector of steady state stock
demands. The system ( ref: flacc ) expresses the short run input adjustment as a proportion of the
desired change.
The parameter restrictions implied by the assumption that, say, lp is perfectly variable are
readily obtained:
r ? Jpp = ?1, Jep = 0, Jcp = 0, Jlp = 0.   #   
The interpretation of Conditions ( ref: variab ) is straightforward. A given input is perfectly variable
if a) its short run change is always a 100% adjustment to the desired change, when the other inputs
are at their steady state levels and b) the size of its desired change does not interact with the short
run adjustments of the other inputs. Conditions ( ref: variab ) can be tested by using standard Wald
tests on the unrestricted matrix M.
As to the regularity conditions for J, the estimation of system ( ref: flacc ) (or  ref: fdiff ) allows
us to check conditions e) and f). Condition e) boils down to Aplpl being a symmetric and
negative-definite matrix, while condition f) implies that M + I is a stable matrix.
Results
We describe our empirical results in two sections. First, we present the estimation and testing
results from three model specifications. In particular, we check for the significant presence of input
adjustment costs and we also asses the fulfillment of the testable regularity conditions. Finally, to
asses the issue of input substitutability, we report short run and long run elasticity estimates.
Estimation and Testing Results
The panel based on BEA data set covers the period 1982-1994 for 32 sectors. Due toconfidentiality concerns some observations are missing, which attributes to the data set an
unbalanced structure. The panel is unbalanced both because the number of observations is different
across industries, and because the observations for the industries do not overlap over time. For 3
sectors there are no years without missing data, as a result these sectors are lost in the data set we
use. Besides, after constructing lags and first differencing, the first two observations of any
uninterrupted interval spanning less than three years are lost for each sector. This makes other 4
sectors disappear, eventually leaving us with 25 sectors. However, there are still enough moment
restrictions available to estimate the whole set of parameters.
For any specification tried we report and comment the two-step estimates. The findings are
however qualitatively the same in the two cases.
We start by presenting the results from the complete parametric specification (Model 1).
Parameter estimates for Model 1 are shown in Table 2 footnote . We have 186 degrees of freedom
corresponding to the number of over-identifying restrictions exploited minus the number of
estimated parameters. Both the one-step and two-step Sargan-Hansen test of the over-identifying
restrictions do not reject the validity of the instruments used at any conventional significance level.
Before proceeding further, a crucial issue is whether the selection rule determining the
unbalanced structure of the panel depends or not on the variables to explain. If it does, then
ignoring the selection rule would lead to biased estimates. We tackle this point by adopting a simple
variable addition test (Verbeek and Nijman,1997). Roughly, this test is based on the idea that if the
selection rule is not ignorable then the pattern of missing observations should significantly affect the
relationship between endogenous and exogenous variables. Thus, Verbeek and Nijman suggest to
include three variables supposedly comprising the effect of the missing data: Ti, the number of
years sector i does not present missing data, ci a dummy variable that is equal to one if sector i
never presents missing data and, finally, si,t?1 the selection indicator lagged one time, indicating
whether sector i is observed in the previous year. If these variables are significant, then there is
evidence of non-ignorable selection rules and a correction procedure for sample selection bias
should be adopted.
A problem with this approach is that the first two variables proposed are in fact time-invariant
and so the corresponding coefficients are not identified in a fixed effects framework. Moreover, as
the dynamic panel approach imposes to discard any uninterrupted interval spanning less than three
years, all the 25 sectors are in fact observed in the previous two periods, which makes both si,t?1
and si,t?2 time-invariant. We therefore apply a modification of the Verbeek and Nijman approach to
Model 1, which relies on si,t?3 and the interaction between si,t?3 and Ti. We find that, both in the
one-step and in the two step estimation, the Wald test of joint significance of the two variables in
the four equations does not reject the hypothesis of ignorability at any conventional level of
significance: the one-step procedure yields e2￿8￿ = 6.829, (P ? value = 0.555), and the two-step
procedure yields e2￿8￿ = 11.687 (P ? value = 0.166). Therefore, even if this finding is by all
means not conclusive about the absence of sample selection bias, we proceed further without
considering sample selection in our estimation procedures.
None of the testable regularity conditions can be rejected. As to condition f), rI + I ? Apll is a
stable matrix, as all its eigenvalues turn out to be within the unit circle, which implies that the
employment profiles converge to a unique steady state. The other regularity condition is e), which
imposes that Aplpl is a symmetric and negative definite matrix. We maintain symmetry and test for
the negative definiteness. Results are less clear-cut in this case as some principal minors have the
wrong sign. However, none of the wrongly signed principal minors turns out to be significantly
different from zero.
It is worth analyzing both the size and the statistical significance of the adjustment speeds in all
areas. To begin with, let us focus on the own adjustment speeds, which are given by the
coefficients on the main diagonal of the adjustment matrix M in ( ref: M ). They measure the actual
input variation within one year as a proportion of the desired change in the input stock. The results
are quite consistent with the stylized facts shown in Section 3. First, adjustment costs are important
in the case of affiliate employment in Latin America and Canada. In fact, if the other inputs are attheir steady state levels, then only 69% of the adjustment to any desired change in the stock of
Latin America affiliate employment occurs within one year. A similar result obtains for affiliate
employment in Canada, where only 78% of the adjustment occur within one year. Secondly,
adjustments are much faster for both parent employment and Europe affiliate employment: very
close to 100% within one year.
However, to properly assess whether an input is perfectly variable we need to test the joint
parameter restrictions in ( ref: variab ), involving not only the own adjustment speed, but also the
interaction terms in the other input demands. In this respect, tests of perfect variability are quite
clear-cut. On the one hand, we can reject the assumption of all inputs being perfectly variable at
any conventional significance level, as the Wald test on the joint parameter restrictions
( ref: variab ) for all inputs is e2￿16￿ = 31.72 (p-value = 0.010). On the other hand, we fail to
reject the same hypothesis when restricted to parent employment and Europe affiliate employment,
since the Wald test on the joint restrictions ( ref: variab ) for this pair of inputs takes on the value
e2￿8￿ = 7.59, (p-value = 0.474).
In Model 1 a large number of parameters are not individually significant, as results from Table
2. In addition, a Wald test of joint significance on 40 such parameters yields e2￿40￿ = 25.97 with a
probability value of 0.957, which does not reject the joint restrictions. Therefore, to obtain a more
parsimonious specification, we have set these parameters to zero and estimated the system
( ref: fdiff ) with such restrictions imposed (Model 2).
The parameter estimates for Model 2 are displayed in Table 3. We now have 226 degrees of
freedom and the value of the Sargan-Hansen test of the overidentifying restrictions is 164.10, with a
probability value of 0.999 to strongly support the validity of our instruments.
As in Model 1, none of the testable regularity conditions is significantly refuted. As to
adjustment speeds, we do not register dramatic changes with respect to the evidence from Model 1.
Affiliate employment in Latin America still has the slowest adjustment, 76% of the desired change
within one year, even if quite close to the speed of affiliate Canada employment: 77%. Again,
adjustment speeds for both parent employment and affiliate employment in Europe are not
significantly different from ?1, which is evidence of a 100% adjustment.
Our third specification (Model 3), besides the restriction of Model 2, also maintains that parent
employment and affiliate employment in Europe are perfectly variable inputs. Restrictions
( ref: variab ) are therefore imposed for both such inputs. The Wald test carried out within Model 1
for the complete set of restrictions imposed in Model 3 does not reject those restrictions
(e2￿44￿ = 31.25 with a probability value of 0.925). Table 4 shows the coefficient estimates.
Again, the Hansen-Sargan test is in favor of the instrument validity and the regularity conditions
cannot be rejected. Adjustment speeds are comparable with the previous findings: 71% and 79%,
respectively for Latin America and Canada. A variability tests on these two inputs yields
e2￿6￿ = 37.60 with a probability value of 0.000, which decidedly reject the hypothesis.
Elasticity Estimates
In the received literature, the multinational responsiveness to relative price variations is
investigated by estimating price (own-price and cross-price) elasticities. In this respect, our
intertemporal analysis can produce novel insights as we can distinguish between short run and long
run behavior. Nonetheless, a problem seems to emerge here. That is, the estimation of the long run
stock price elasticities requires estimating the steady state levels l￿pl,y￿ = ?￿r ? Apll￿?1
￿ApllApl
i + ryApll￿Aply + Aplplpl￿￿. Unfortunately, the latter depend on the sector specific effect
ApllApl
i , which is not consistently estimated when T is small. We work around this problem by
dwelling upon the long run flow elasticities, which measure the response of the annual change in
the steady state employment to a relative price variation. Differently from the long run stock
elasticities, flow elasticities are identified under our parametrization as the derivatives with respect
to the prices are the same for both stocks and flows and the latter do not depend on the sector
specific effect.
For computational ease, we get the price elasticity estimates from the two more parsimoniousspecification of Models 2 and 3. Tables 5 and 6 present the values of the medians of short-run stock
and flow and long-run flow price elasticities for this two models. We calculate both the elasticities
and the corresponding standard errors at each sample observation. The elasticities that are more
frequently significant are parents and Latin American affiliates own price elasticities and cross
price elasticities between parents and Latin America and of employment in Europe in response of a
wage change in Latin America. The short-run and long-run elasticities present the same sign in
both specifications, and, notably, in most of the cases the elasticities’ values are not very different.
Taking previous indications about elasticities’ significance into account, we can now analyze
the complementarity/substitution issue. Tables 5 and 6 show that, in the short run, there is
substitution between affiliates located in Latin America and parents in the US. This is no longer
true in the long run, where the relationship is of complementarity. At the same time, an increase in
the relative wage of affiliates located in Latin America causes an increase in employment in
Europe, both in the short and long run. How to interpret this puzzle? A possible story is as follows.
An increase in the relative wage of affiliates located in Latin America reduces the desired stock of
labor in this area. This increases the gap between actual and desired employment in Latin America
making adjustment costs higher. As a consequence, the multinational rises employment in the
parent to maintain its output level. However, the optimal response to the changing convenience of
producing in Latin America compared to other geographical areas, will be to modify more deeply
the location of production within the multinational. A more formal discussion of the
substitutability/complementarity reversion is offered in Appendix B, analysing the issue within the
context of a slight extension of the example in Section 2.
Long-run cross price elasticities show that the response to a wage increase in Latin American
affiliates will be an expansion of employment in Europe and a contraction of the workforce in the
US and in Latin America. Because of the presence of high transport costs and trade barriers, the
increase of Latin American wage, changing the relative convenience to produce in the Western
Hemisphere and export to Europe, leads to a delocation of activities towards Europe. Proximity to
the final market seems to be in this case one of the most important determinant of location decision.
The result of complementarity between employment at home and in Latin American affiliates in
the long run, suggests a vertical division of activities among countries with different workforce skill
levels.
A complementarity relationship between employment in Latin American affiliates and in the
US parents seems to emerge also from the long-run cross price elasticities with respect to Europe
wage changes. While the immediate response to an increase of European wage is a contraction of
parent employment and a rise in Latin American labor demand to take advantage of wage
differentials, in the long-run, the sign of parent elasticities becomes positive. It seems plausible that
in the light of growing costs of performing activities in developed countries, the multinational can
decide to increase the delocation of labor intensive stages of production towards developing regions
and maintain the skilled intensive activities in the parent. In the long-run, due to the vertical link
between different stages of production, the expansion of activities performed by Latin American
affiliates may tend to bring with it an expansion of activities performed by the parents.
Conclusions
In this study we have developed a dynamic model of the multinational firm that explicitly
allows for the presence of input adjustment costs. Building upon such a model, we have then
carried out an empirical application to industry level data on US multinationals.
Treating labor in different geographical locations as separate factors of production, we test for
the presence of adjustment costs and also estimate short-run and long-run cross-price elasticities.
We find evidence of significant adjustment costs for employment in Latin American and Canadian
affiliates. We also find that, in some instances, due to the presence of slow input adjustments, the
complementarity/substitution relationship between employment in different international locations
is reversed from the short to the long-run.
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For the sake of completeness, we spell out the procedure devised in Bruno (1999), generalizing
the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator to the case of a system of equations with
cross-equation parameter restrictions.
Assume that we have a panel of N individuals and that each individual i is observed for Ti ‡ 3
periods of time. Consider a system of M equations with random disturbances O = O1v,...,OMv v
which have the properties defined in Section?. We wish to estimate a vector of parameters K,
assuming that the dimension of K guarantees the identification. Let Z be the >i=1
N ￿Ti ? 2￿ ￿ k
matrix of instruments as derived in Section ? For each equation, define the corresponding
>i=1
N ￿Ti ? 2￿ ￿ 1 vector of orthogonality conditions mi￿K￿ = Zv ￿AOi￿, i = 1,...,M, and then stack
them in a single vector m￿K￿ = ￿m1v￿K￿,...,mMv￿K￿￿
v. Let AN be the
M >i=1
N ￿Ti ? 2￿ ￿ M >i=1
N ￿Ti ? 2￿ optimal weighting matrix. The optimal GMM estimator is then
given by
￿
K = arg min
K mv￿K￿ AN m￿K￿ .
Hansen (1982) showed that the optimal choice for AN is 1
N m m
v ?1
, where m is an estimate of
m￿K￿ from a consistent first step estimator
￿
K1. As a result, a feasible GMM estimator can be
obtained in two steps. The first step estimator is obtained by slightly generalizing the Arellano and
Bond procedure. Let Hi be a ￿Ti ? 2￿ square matrix that has twos in the main diagonal, minus one
in the first subdiagonals and zeroes otherwise. Then, form a >i=1
N ￿Ti ? 2￿ block diagonal matrix
H, with Hi = block i of H. Let AN = 1
N Zv H Z
?1
and, finally, get the first step estimator
￿
K1 = arg min
K mv￿K￿ AN m￿K￿ .
Now, use
￿
K1 to construct m , which yields the second step estimator
￿








K2 are asymptotically equivalent if the Oit
s, s = 1,...,M, i = 1,...,N, t = 3,...,Ti are
independent and homoskedastic across individuals, equations and over time.Appendix B
We address the issue of the sign reversion from the short run to the long-run within a slight
generalization of the example in Section 2. The production process now involves two quasi-fixed
inputs, employment at region A and employment at region B, and a perfectly variable input,
employment at C. The multinational company chooses the employment paths in the three regions to
minimize its discounted flow of costs over an infinite horizon, as in ( ref: minval ). We assume that
the intertemporal optimization problem yields the following employment demand functions at
regions A and B
lA = LA ? KAAwA + KABwB + JAAl?1
A + JABl?1
B
lB = LB ? KBBwB + KABwA + JBBl?1
B
where wi denotes the wage paid to workers at region i = A, B normalized by the wage paid to
workers at C . The reader can notice that the optimal employment profiles are such that the
employment adjustment in region B affects the adjustment in region A, with the converse not true.
Then, assume that the matrix ÆJij￿ is stable and that the steady states l
B
= ￿LB ?KBBwB
+KABwA￿/￿1 ?JBB￿ and l
A
= ￿LA ?KAAwA +KABwB +JABl
B
￿/￿1 ? JAA￿ are always non-negative.
Now, the short-run cross-price elasticities are
aAB
s?r = KAB lA
wB
aBA
s?r = KAB lB
wA
,
while the long-run cross-price elasticities are
aAB
l?r = KAB￿1 ? JBB￿ ? JABKBB











It is not hard to see that the short-run response of lA to a change of wB, aAB
s?r, does not need have the
same sign as the corresponding long-run response, aAB
l?r, since no sign restriction applies on
KAB￿1 ? JBB￿ ?JABKBB. This is not the case for lB as the adjustment at region A has no impact on
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R.World Aff./ParentTable 1 - Autocorrelation coefficients of employment annual changes
Autocorrelation coefficients
Parents 0.05
Europe        -0.04
Canada 0.11
Latin America 0.17
Rest of the World 0.05
Source: our calculations on BEA data retrieved from Feenstra (1997)Table 2 - Parameters estimates from Model 1
Test of overidentifying restrictions = 169.728     [.798]
Degrees of freedom = 186
Number of Observations = 100
                          Standard
 Parameter  Estimate        Error       t-statistic   P-value
 BPL        .568238E-04   .912487E-03   .062274       [.950]
 BEL        .454541E-03   .928995E-03   .489282       [.625]
 BCL        .110171E-02   .736590E-03   1.49569       [.135]
 BLL        -.798228E-02  .277707E-02   -2.87436      [.004]
 BL         -.435562E-02  .329391E-02   -1.32232      [.186]
 BPC        -.659348E-03  .426136E-03   -1.54727      [.122]
 BEC        .197868E-05   .430849E-03   .459252E-02   [.996]
 BCC        .844445E-04   .381751E-03   .221203       [.825]
 BC         .356319E-03   .163229E-02   .218294       [.827]
 BPE        .525571E-03   .760810E-03   .690804       [.490]
 BEE        .162589E-03   .819955E-03   .198290       [.843]
 BE         -.284898E-02  .292148E-02   -.975183      [.329]
 BPP        -.012847      .403238E-02   -3.18604      [.001]
 BP         .106808       .017316       6.16808       [.000]
 APP        1.16195       .065115       17.8447       [.000]
 APE        .482769       .900293       .536236       [.592]
 APC        4.45659       1.60969       2.76860       [.006]
 APL        -.750719      .918484       -.817346      [.414]
 AEE        .995513       .125123       7.95628       [.000]
 AEP        -.907176E-02  .902607E-02   -1.00506      [.315]
 AEC        .085477       .247283       .345663       [.730]
 AEL        -.275293      .132871       -2.07188      [.038]
 ACC        .850586       .128180       6.63589       [.000]
 ACP        -.487665E-02  .472335E-02   -1.03245      [.302]
 ACE        -.048261      .065741       -.734117      [.463]
 ACL        -.026677      .068640       -.388649      [.698]
 ALL        .766117       .125560       6.10158       [.000]
 ALP        -.809472E-02  .810779E-02   -.998388      [.318]
 ALE        -.024391      .112389       -.217021      [.828]
 ALC        -.332180      .232545       -1.42846      [.153]
Equation    PLEQ    Dependent variable: PL
R-squared =  .987
Equation    ELEQ    Dependent variable: EL
R-squared = .997
Equation    CLEQ    Dependent variable: CL
R-squared = .988
Equation    LLEQ    Dependent variable: LL
R-squared = .986Table 3 - Parameter estimates from Model 2
Test of overidentifying restrictions = 164.105  [.999]
Degrees of freedom = 226
Number of Observations = 100
                          Standard
 Parameter  Estimate        Error       t-statistic   P-value
 BEL        .594694E-03   .756043E-03   .786587       [.432]
 BLL        -.545777E-02  .189902E-02   -2.87400      [.004]
 BL         -.377688E-02  .250383E-02   -1.50844      [.131]
 BPC        -.369504E-03  .289529E-03   -1.27622      [.202]
 BCC        .126934E-03   .289763E-03   .438061       [.661]
 BC         .165300E-02   .114075E-02   1.44905       [.147]
 BPE        .684993E-03   .570988E-03   1.19966       [.230]
 BEE        -.413138E-03  .592100E-03   -.697749      [.485]
 BE         -.269494E-02  .199932E-02   -1.34792      [.178]
 BPP        -.013168      .322122E-02   -4.08789      [.000]
 BP         .099519       .013709       7.25967       [.000]
 APP        1.13588       .060174       18.8764       [.000]
 APC        4.09179       1.61589       2.53222       [.011]
 APL        -1.42301      .720949       -1.97380      [.048]
 AEE        .921465       .099056       9.30242       [.000]
 AEL        -.257099      .110515       -2.32636      [.020]
 ACC        .846345       .107573       7.86765       [.000]
 ACP        -.553037E-02  .398099E-02   -1.38920      [.165]
 ALL        .835258       .101020       8.26826       [.000]
 ALP        -.939341E-02  .717473E-02   -1.30924      [.190]
 ALC        -.450059      .192459       -2.33846      [.019]
Equation    PLEQ    Dependent variable: PL
R-squared = .986
Equation    ELEQ    Dependent variable: EL
R-squared = .997
Equation    CLEQ    Dependent variable: CL
R-squared = .989
Equation    LLEQ    Dependent variable: LL
R-squared = .986Table 4 - Parameter estimates from Model 3
Test of overidentifying restrictions = 173.185 [.998]
Degrees of freedom =   230
Number of Observations =    100
                          Standard
 Parameter  Estimate        Error       t-statistic   P-value
 BEL        .891905E-03   .732037E-03   1.21839       [.223]
 BLL        -.637844E-02  .187239E-02   -3.40657      [.001]
 BL         -.484929E-02  .259758E-02   -1.86685      [.062]
 BPC        -.321196E-03  .281476E-03   -1.14111      [.254]
 BCC        .153834E-03   .286047E-03   .537792       [.591]
 BC         .120974E-02   .104726E-02   1.15515       [.248]
 BPE        .383369E-03   .423633E-03   .904954       [.365]
 BEE        -.337907E-03  .470017E-03   -.718924      [.472]
 BE         -.283454E-02  .168699E-02   -1.68023      [.093]
 BPP        -.014150      .336933E-02   -4.19955      [.000]
 BP         .105089       .013685       7.67935       [.000]
 APC        4.11989       1.61991       2.54328       [.011]
 APL        -1.26049      .698548       -1.80444      [.071]
 AEL        -.302182      .098167       -3.07826      [.002]
 ACC        .860225       .105782       8.13202       [.000]
 ALL        .781014       .099463       7.85235       [.000]
 ALC        -.443708      .199031       -2.22934      [.026]
Equation    PLEQ    Dependent variable: PL
R-squared = .986
Equation    ELEQ    Dependent variable: EL
R-squared = .998
Equation    CLEQ    Dependent variable: CL
R-squared = .989
Equation    LLEQ    Dependent variable: LL
R-squared = .985Table 5 - Stock and flow cross price elasticities (Model Two) - MEDIANS
Price Parent Europe Canada Latin America
Short-run Stock
W - Parent -0,45209* 0,0949 -0,12909 0,065543*
W - Europe -0,001306 -0,053393 -0,001524 0,077411
W - Canada 0,002304 0,0000 0,046897 -0,009607
W - Latin America 0,047012* 0,06687* 0.0000 -0,23128*
Short-run Flow
W - Parent -5,46690* 3,35760* -3,03428* 1,12283*
W - Europe -0,014377 -1,95163 -0,032722 1,36463
W - Canada 0,022758 0,0000 1,11093 -0,16745
W - Latin America 0,51559* 2,31217* 0,0000 -4,33215*
Long-run Flow
W - Parent -4,54911* 3,56680* -5,64566* -0,084430*
W - Europe 0,18838 -1,38424 0,0083489 1,35341
W - Canada -0,11270 0,0065113 1,67101 0,012698
W - Latin America -0,053042* 0,48155 -0,015544 -3,47157*
Note: * indicates significance at the 10 percent level.Table 6 - Stock and flow cross price elasticities (Model Three) - MEDIANS
Price Parent Europe Canada Latin America
Short-run Stock
W - Parent -0,45538* 0,061071 -0,1502 0,032089
W - Europe -0,013587 -0,062905 0.0000 0,11059
W - Canada 0,006727 0.0000 0,055307 -0,012099
W - Latin America 0,049546* 0,098683* 0.0000 -0,25532*
Short-run Flow
W - Parent -5,40272* 2,16991 -3,75306* 0,56312
W - Europe -0,15247 -2,35175 0,0000 2,01460
W - Canada 0,072329 0,0000 1,38332 -0,22039
W - Latin America 0,56647* 3,15450* 0,0000 -4,55033*
Long-run Flow
W - Parent -4,72664* 2,04044* -4,29439* -0,042163
W - Europe 0,11571 -1,32898 0,0000 1,68733*
W - Canada -0,096054 0,010291 1,75029 0,016168
W - Latin America -0,058824* 0,87913 0,0000 -3,40103*
Note: * indicates significance at the 10 percent level.